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Abstract 
Do short-term contracts facilitate the transition into permanent contracts? We use a rich 
administrative database for the Emilia-Romagna northern region in Italy from 2008 to 2012 
to run a stepping-stone analysis and evaluate which contractual agreement is more likely to 
lead to a permanent working position. We find that individual specific characteristics make 
it more likely for a worker to be employed with a specific contractual agreement and that 
the contribution towards more working stability varies with the previous contract. We 
conclude that fixed-term positions act more as stumbling blocks than building blocks for 
open-ended contracts. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, most Western economies have faced the need to boost market competitiveness 
through processes of delocalisation, out-sourcing, and introducing more flexibility in the labour 
market. More flexibility was meant to allow a larger share of the population to enter the labour 
market by means of innovative, short-term, and ‘atypical’ contractual forms. The parallel scope 
was endowing firms with innovative instruments to meet swings in final demand by adopting on-
demand labour schemes. 
Institutions in Italy and in many other European countries were increasingly urged to 
introduce more flexible contracts, as global markets entered a phase of harsh competitiveness, 
especially in the aftermath of the financial crisis (not to mention the pivotal role of the new Asian 
manufacturing giants led by China). ‘Flexisecurity’ (European Commission, 2017) became 
almost a must for Spain, France, the UK, Germany, and Italy. 
It must be underlined that it all started as a progressive liberalisation of the labour market at 
the margin, as short-term jobs, for instance temporary agency contracts, were increasingly 
deregulated, while the bulk of the permanent contract legislation was not or was only scarcely 
affected. 
A recent major reform of the labour market was introduced in 2015 (Jobs Act), implementing 
a series of active policies targeting the core of the dependent labour contractual agreements, that 
is, the permanent working contract. The previous contract was substituted with a ‘contratto a 
tutele crescenti’, removing the possibility of a worker’s reinstatement (‘reintegro’) after 
illegitimate dismissal for economic motives and embedding an increasing monetary compensation 
in the case of separation. This measure further empowered the demand side of the labour market 
by weakening the supply side further. 
The academic and political debate started questioning the effectiveness of the deregulation in 
creating more opportunities against the odds of more uncertainty in the labour market. Some 
authors started wondering if firms’ productivity was likely to benefit from such deregulation or 
suffer from the increasing uncertainty and potential lack of motivation and skills of temporary 
workers. 
The negative effects of the Great Recession probably exacerbated the undesirable aspects of 
the labour market deregulation. As a matter of fact, the composition and nature of contracts 
changed dramatically. In about 20 years, Italy experienced the doubling of temporary jobs, from 
about 7% in 1994 to about 14% in 2014. In other countries, such as France, the same figure 
increased by one-third, with temporary jobs growing from 11% to 16%, while Germany 
experienced an increase from 11% to 13%. Spain ranked third among the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in 2014 with a figure of 24% 
(OECD, 2016). 
In this study, we investigate the role of short-term contracts in facilitating or hindering the 
transition into permanent jobs. We use a large, proprietary, and unique dataset (SILER) of 
observations of dependent workers in Emilia-Romagna in the time span from 2008 to 2012 to 
evaluate whether short-term, atypical contracts operate as stepping-stones towards permanent 
contracts. We adopt a multinomial logit approach (Greene, 2002) to identify the relative 
probability of being awarded a given contract type, considering a set of internal and external 
factors, contributing to the ‘stepping-stone’ literature with a thorough micro-level analysis. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the data. Section 4 describes the methodology and reports the empirical results. Section 
5 discusses the results and concludes. 
2 The Stepping-stone Issue in the Literature 
The possibility that short-term, atypical jobs may turn into more stable working positions is 
relevant under many different aspects. A first concern in the socio-economic debate relates to the 
social implications of unsafe and unstable working conditions. Precarious working conditions can 
affect the perceived well-being materially and psychologically (de Graaf-Zijl, 2006) and therefore 
affect the life quality and lifestyle of society as a whole. If ever-increasing short-term, temporary 
jobs fail to create a secure job environment, perhaps resulting in an infinite cycle of temporary 
positions, the outcomes could be far from desirable. A second concern relates to the effect on 
workers’ performance. Jahn, Riphahn, and Schnabel (2012), when assessing the effect of labour 
market deregulation of firms’ productivity, pointed to a possible trade-off between efficiency and 
equity. Less motivated workers are likely not so keen in investing in their activities if the prospects 
are uncertain. 
The academic focus concerning the recent labour market reforms in Italy has been greatly 
involved in evaluating the ‘stepping-stone’ versus the opposite ‘deadlock’ hypothesis. A stepping-
stone effect would support the idea that, on average, flexibility is paying off in terms of more 
labour participation, higher productivity, and labour market efficiency. Evidence of a deadlock 
would let the policy makers infer the opposite. 
The empirical evidence of the stepping-stone effect is mixed, and results change depending 
on the specific type of contract considered, regarding age, gender, labour market context, and so 
on. However, it is also likely to depend on the methodology used (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). 
In Europe overall, there is some unclear evidence concerning the effectiveness of temporary jobs 
in leading to more stable or fixed-term contractual agreements. 
On one side, the introduction of ‘atypical’ or ‘flexible’ contractual agreements may actually 
give an opportunity to enter the labour market where none existed before. Ichino et al. (2008) 
detected two broad theoretical points of view for why temporary employment could offer a 
springboard to stable jobs: 1) more able workers can use temporary work to signal their skill by 
making themselves available for screening, and 2) temporary jobs may be an opportunity to build 
extra human capital, social contacts, and information. Whenever the first point prevails, the 
screening procedure can also induce less shirking and build more stable relationships between 
employers and employees (Portugal and Varejao, 2009). In the same article, Ichino et al. (2008) 
provided positive evidence for the springboard effect for workers hired through temporary 
agencies. Some effectiveness of the stepping-stone is also found in Barbieri and Sestito (2008). 
On the other, the ‘trap’ or ‘deadlock’ hypothesis in an endless precarious condition cannot be 
ruled out, so that the empirical investigation can only provide some evidence. According to 
Blanchard and Landier (2002), the use of temporary workers as buffer stocks increases job 
instability and uncertainty inside the firm, reduces investment in training, lowers workplace 
cooperation and worker motivation, and harms long-run growth prospects. Exactly the opposite 
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evidence from that found for Italy by Ichino et al. (2008) is instead found in Spain by Amuedo-
Dorantes et al. (2008). In the United States, Autor and Houseman (2010) considered a welfare-
to-work programme in Detroit and found that temporary help placements may even harm 
subsequent employment and earning outcomes. 
Across Europe, temporary jobs are associated with poorer labour conditions with respect to 
standard employment: lower wages, lower training, lower job security, and lower protection from 
social security. In their introduction to the Economic Journal Symposium on temporary jobs, 
Booth et al. (2002) summarised the thrust of the contributions as suggesting that the expansion of 
temporary jobs as a way of increasing labour market flexibility may be undesirable, although in 
some cases they indeed found some stepping-stone evidence in the case of British workers. Booth 
et al. (2002) are the authors of a pioneering work on the stepping-stone hypothesis, where apart 
from assessing the existence of such ‘entry ports’, they also found that temporary workers in Great 
Britain reported lower levels of job satisfaction and received less training and lower wages. 
Studying the same subject for Australia, Cai, Law, and Bathgate (2014) modelled the 
evaluation of the different starting statuses, stating in particular that, when trying to assess the 
correct probability of transitioning into a fixed-term contract from a temporary job, the individuals 
out of the labour force should be considered a baseline case since those who are simply 
unemployed are already putting some effort into finding a job. They found evidence for the 
stepping-stone effect. Addison et al. (2015) tested the stepping-stone hypothesis for US workers 
and found positive results, controlling for endogeneity that may lead a worker to be in a given 
position rather than another, with the special caveat that the labour market in the US is highly 
polarised between temporary, unskilled, low-pay workers and high-pay, specialised, temporary 
consultants and contractors. Drawing on data from representative national longitudinal studies, 
Scherer (2004) found that lower mobility chances in Italy and the strongly segmented labour 
market in Germany inhibit the exit out of a labour market segment once it has been entered, 
therefore hinting at an entrapment effect. Bosco and Valeriani (2017, 2018), using propensity 
score techniques, found evidence of trapping effects for temporary agency workers and even more 
for fixed-term employees. 
3 The Data 
The database Sistema Informativo sul Lavoro (SILER) in Emilia-Romagna is a proprietary 
database collecting the mandatory communications to be sent whenever a new labour contract is 
created, extended, transformed, or ceased in the region of Emilia-Romagna. The database offers 
a wide range of possibilities to analyse the trend and dynamics of the labour force before the same 
data are processed at the national level. Since every person1 in the dependent labour market of the 
region is detected, it becomes possible to track the working life of people in a given time span 
and to follow them until the exit from the dependent labour market. Thus, features such as age, 
_________________________ 
1 Every person who underwent a registration, termination, transformation, or extension of a contract in Emilia-
Romagna since 2008. 
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education, citizenship, and industry among others can be related to the length and type of the 
contractual agreements undersigned. 
The advantage of this type of data is to get a unique view of employees’ working life and to 
obtain some potentially significant contributions to the empirical studies of the labour market 
from the economic and institutional viewpoints. While linking the results to macroeconomic data 
is tricky but interesting (for reasons that will become clear below), it is possible to evaluate the 
various types of contracts arising through the years: basically, permanent jobs versus flexible and 
atypical contracts. 
We work on a sample of workers observed over five years, from 2008 to 2012, to track the 
working life pattern of all individuals who appeared for the first time in 2008. We considered all 
the workers who had at least one contract starting in 2008 and had up to five contracts overall 
during the period from 2008 to 2012. The limit of five contracts per worker has a triple rationale. 
First, in a given year, the percentage of workers with more than four contracts is no larger than 
5%. This means that, for each year, we are capturing about 95% of the workers, which is almost 
the whole dependent worker population. Even if the distribution is less concentrated in a five-
year time span, as workers are more likely to have more than one contract, we still consider about 
80% of them. Second, as the elaboration on such huge data requires prohibitive amounts of time, 
we set a limit of five contracts for efficiency, conscious that our results are robust anyway given 
the high representativeness of the sample. Third, by ruling out those few individuals with a 
plethora of very short-term, highly volatile contracts, we reduce some noise stemming from day-
by-day contracts, representing a minority of the set. 
Ideally, the workers can be split into five groups: those who only have one contract in the five 
years considered and those with two, three, four, or five contracts (but always with at least one 
contract starting in 2008). We disregard workers having started to work earlier than 2008 or after 
2012. Table 1 reports the distribution of workers according to the number of contracts held. 
There are 1,288,095 contracts started in 2008 (resulting in 2.27 contracts per person). Some 
of the contracts we consider are concluded before 31 December 2012, but we do not investigate 
further on what follows. Some other contracts are still current on 31 December 2012, but we right-
censored them. Some contracts overlap for the same person since it happens for part-time workers, 
for example, to have more than one job at a time. (We control for this in the analysis). For each 
worker, we observe the age at the beginning of the contract, sex, citizenship, contract type 
according to the taxonomy reported in the appendix2 and under Table 2, education level, 
economic sector, province, professional category, and skill level. Two variables for time have 
been computed: the length of the contracts in days and the length of the time span between one 
contract and another for those individuals having at least two non-overlapping contracts in the 
period. This second time variable can be considered the ‘waiting period’ between the end of a 
contract and the start of another, for those workers having a contract starting after the end of the 
 
  
_________________________ 
2 The reclassification of contractual types was created in 2013 to summarize a number of various agreements into eight 
categories. The variables according to which contracts were pooled into categories are duration, degree of independence 
from the employer, flexibility in working hours, and other social variables. 
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Table 1: Workers with at least one contract started in 2008 and number of contracts held  
(up to five contracts, 2008–2012) 
NUMBER OF 
CONTRACTS 
WORKERS PERCENTAGE 
1 234,284 41.35 
2 126,904 22.4 
3 83,364 14.71 
4 60,524 10.68 
5 61,563 10.86 
      
1,288,095 566,639 100 
 
previous one in the quinquennial period. We do not observe the effective length of time between 
two contracts in the case in which the first ends before 31 December 2012, and the second starts 
from 1 January 2013, onwards. 
The initial set contains 566,639 workers aged between 13 and 75, with this age bracket 
representing the age at the beginning of the first contract registered in 2008. To fully appreciate 
the information on contractual types, it is advisable to preliminarily go through Table A.1 in the 
Appendix, where each type of reclassified contractual agreement is illustrated.3 Basically, we 
have open-ended contracts on one side (representing 30% of the first contractual agreements 
signed in 2008) and atypical contracts on the other, fully differentiated into seven subgroups of 
temporary contractual agreements. Our set, referring to the first contractual agreement signed in 
2008, can be described by the figures in Table 2. 
Younger workers are engaged in apprenticeships and internships, but the way to the open-
ended contract is quite long, since, on average, a worker gets one at 36. Domestic workers, 
females, and foreigners are older workers, followed by those workers with para-subordinate 
contractual agreements. The percentage of males in open-ended contracts is 60%, a first sign of 
gender discrimination that also appears from other indicators (as the fragmentation of working 
life contracts is much higher for women, even if we cannot tell without further investigation 
whether this is at least partly due to individual/family preferences). The educational attainment 
of workers is pretty low. University degrees (and post-university education) is rare. Fixed-term 
contracts on average last about eight months, while the shortest duration is registered for 
temporary agency workers. It must also be underlined that these workers are also those who wait 
less between the first contract and the following one, while it takes substantial time to find another 
job after an internship. Open-ended contracts are the most popular in services and industry, while 
jobs on call are especially concentrated in trade and tourism (this is explained by the seasonality 
of the tourist area on the seaside of Romagna). Para-subordinate workers are those with the 
highest average skill level (they also have a high concentration of university graduates). Domestic 
female workers are those with the lowest skill level. 
 
_________________________ 
3 The reclassification is aimed at creating uniform job categories. Nonetheless, about 8% of contracts were the result 
of merging two different types, whenever the first one was transformed in another contractual type, such as from fixed-
term to an open-ended type. For details on the initial treatment of the data, see CRISP (2014). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of workers by working arrangement (mean values) 
  
OPEN-
ENDED  
FIXED 
TERM  
INTERN
SHIPS 
DOMESTIC 
WORKERS 
JOBS 
ON 
CALL 
PARA- 
SUBORDINATE
 WORK  
TEMPORARY 
AGENCY 
WORK  
APPRENT- 
ICESHIP 
AND 
ACCESS-TO-
WORK  
Individual 
characteristics         
Age 36.26 35.92 22.62 41.30 33.26 38.51 30.77 21.04 
Female 0.40 0.50 0.56 0.86 0.56 0.45 0.42 0.42 
Foreign 0.26 0.28 0.10 0.91 0.17 0.08 0.24 0.22 
Education level         
Primary School 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.88 0.64 0.69 0.54 0.67 
Junior High 
School 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.06 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.18 
High School 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.14 
University 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 
Job characteristics         
Duration in 
days a 855.7 225.7 156.0 393.1 339.3 346.2 139.2 395.5 
Part time 0.22 0.25 0.12 0.81 0.23 0.06 0.16 0.19 
Waiting period 
in days b 107.0 178.9 240.4 180.7 220.9 152.8 123.8 243.6 
Overlapping c 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.052 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.006 
Sector         
Industry 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.55 0.25 
Agriculture 0.008 0.181 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.005 
Trade and 
Tourism 0.16 0.24 0.23 0.01 0.63 0.14 0.18 0.33 
Services 0.39 0.24 0.44 0.97 0.28 0.50 0.20 0.22 
Education d 0.038 0.064 0.036 0.000 0.014 0.169 0.002 0.002 
Construction 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.16 
Skill level         
High 0.26 0.14 0.41 0.01 0.09 0.67 0.11 0.12 
Medium 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.22 0.72 0.28 0.42 0.79 
Low 0.30 0.39 0.09 0.78 0.20 0.05 0.43 0.09 
N 175,532 241,331 9,250 18,801 9,637 43,285 36,248 29,805 
Notes: 
N total = 563,889. For 2,750 workers, we do not have the contract type, and statistics were not reported. 
a: For open-ended contracts lasting more than five years, the maximum allowed is 1,826 days. Part-time contracts were 
weighted by 0.5 for length. 
b: Only for those individuals with more than one contract from 2008 to 2012, as the number of days between the end 
of the first contract and the beginning of the second contract, with non-overlapping contracts. 
c: Percentage of individuals with more than one contract at once, after the first one registered. 
d: Workers in the education sector, as a proxy for employees in the public sector. They were subtracted from the services 
sector. 
 
In the appendix, a descriptive exploration through likelihood for each type of observed 
contract quantifies the importance of several factors, which are the same as we use in the stepping-
stone analysis below. Coefficients larger than 1 imply that the factor increases the probability of 
the given contract type; below zero, it is decreased. 
After how many contracts, if ever, do these workers end up with an open-ended contract? The 
transition into a permanent position happens as depicted in Table 3. On the first column, we have 
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the initial working agreement observed in 2008. In the other columns, we have the number of 
workers who reach a permanent contract in the second, third, fourth, and fifth contracts, 
respectively. 
Those starting with a permanent contract also represent the majority of permanent contracts 
in the second working position. The second category most likely to reach a permanent position is 
the one represented by fixed-term workers, followed by temporary agency workers. 
Nonetheless, it seems that temporary agency workers have a higher probability of entering an 
open-ended contract with respect to the fixed-term contracts. For those who reach the permanent 
position on the second contract, about 9.9% are temporary workers, while 6.3% are fixed-term 
workers. Therefore, we find traces for an effect that could go on the opposite direction of what 
was found by Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2008). For the Spanish case, agency workers endured a 
lower likelihood of being hired on a permanent basis following their temporary assignment than 
their direct-hire (fixed-term) counterparts. 
Para-subordinate workers do worse, as only 5.7% obtain an open-ended contract as a second 
contract. Interestingly, the entry rate into a permanent position (second contract) is 8.9% for 
apprentices, a bit lower than for temporary workers. A possible explanation is that a learning 
effect is taking place for temporary agency workers, as they have a higher chance to be 
subsequently hired with regular contracts than their fixed-term counterparts (and even 
apprentices). Or perhaps firms are using temporary agency workers as a screening device, while 
they are adopting fixed-term contracts as a real alternative to regular contracts, but not in the 
perspective of hiring workers on a more stable basis. 
After how long, if ever, do workers reach a permanent working position? We computed 
Kaplan-Meier estimates of duration of non-employment between the first and second contract, 
when the second contract is permanent (this refers to column 2 in Table 3). The estimates in 
Figure 1 reveal that the transition varies with the starting contract type. 
Table 3: Transition to the final open-ended contract, 2008–2012 
  OPEN-ENDED CONTRACT AS ENDING ARRANGEMENT BY 
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS 
INITIAL ARRANGEMENT 2 contracts 3 contracts 4 contracts 5 contracts 
Apprenticeships and access-to-work  2,595 1,586 939 536 
Fixed term  15,414 11,848 9,715 6,481 
Open-ended  27,129 10,698 4,842 2,346 
Internships 882 668 412 225 
Domestic workers 626 390 252 158 
Jobs on call 487 320 224 140 
Para-subordinate work  2,471 1,877 1,099 714 
Temporary agency work  3,597 3,091 2,079 1,554 
n.a. 259 158 82 40 
N 53,460 30,636 19,644 12,194 
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Figure 1: Transition to permanent contract, average in days, from first to second contract. 
Table 4: Transition in days to the final open-ended contract, waiting period, and mean values by initial 
contract type and by number of contracts 
  Days before the open-ended contract by number of contracts 
Initial arrangement 2 contracts 3 contracts 4 contracts 5 contracts 
Apprenticeships 
and access-to-work  
133 94 66 57 
Fixed term  126 87 60 54 
Open-ended  55 61 61 62 
Internships 143 82 63 46 
Domestic workers 67 94 67 73 
Jobs on call 149 88 85 56 
Para-
subordinate work  
125 81 69 60 
Temporary agency 
work  
88 89 76 42 
n.a. 104 61 35 40 
N 110 82 65 54 
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Permanent workers changing their jobs wait on average less than anyone else. They have more 
probability of obtaining a permanent position and wait less than the rest. In addition, apprentices 
have a relatively easy transition. The six months and one-year thresholds are particularly evident 
for para-subordinate workers and for interns. When considering the whole contracts observed, we 
obtain Table 4, reporting the mean waiting period in days between the first contract observed and 
the next permanent contract. 
As time goes by, the waiting period decreases. The cumulated effects of age and experience 
probably favour worker stabilisation. Some contracts, though, suffer more than others, such as 
jobs on call and internships. Temporary agency workers perform better than fixed-term workers 
in this aspect, and this result is in line with the ratios discussed above. 
4 Empirical Strategy 
Our objective is to consider several internal and external factors that can affect the ex-post 
probability of being awarded a given contract type with respect to a baseline case. We are aware 
that individual unobserved characteristics can also affect the ex-ante probability of being selected 
into a permanent, fixed-term, or any other specific position. The large size of our database, 
though, and previous published results support the hypothesis that the effect of unobservable 
factors should be minimum. 
We ran a multinomial analysis for the second type of contract observed in the career of every 
individual in our sample with at least two contracts, given the initial category of the contract held. 
We could therefore track the likelihood of ending up with a given type of contract, given the 
previous status. We ruled out those types of contracts that are not deemed to be proper ‘dependent 
labour’ contracts, that is, domestic labour, jobs on call, and traineeships (as the first only relate to 
working at households as caretakers or nurses, the second is very erratic, and the third is often 
unpaid and unstable even if potentially leading to a more stable job). 
We focus on the transition between the first and second contracts, as we rely on the high 
number of initial observations to control for potential latent variables inducing self-selection into 
a given working position. We performed the analysis for high-numbered transitions (from first to 
third, from second to third, and so on) but did not report the results since they do not differ 
significantly from the current results. 
Specifically, the multinomial analysis allows for computing the ‘success probability’ of an 
event with respect to a base event category using workers’ features, contract location, economic 
branch, and so on as explanatory factors. This methodological approach is used in the literature, 
when trying to assess the stepping-stone hypothesis towards a fixed-term contract type. It fits 
those situations where the variable one wants to explain in terms of success/failure is of a 
categorical type, and the related fitted coefficients for the explanatory variables (expressed as 
relative risks ratios) describe the probability that an event belongs to a given category with respect 
to the base event/category that can be arbitrarily chosen when a change in the explanatory variable 
is observed. We created dummies for the economic sectors and for provinces. The model for the 
‘Work Status’ is therefore expressed by the following formula: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑗) =
𝑒
𝛽𝑗
′𝑥𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑘
′𝑥𝑖𝐽
𝑘=0
, 
 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the categorical variable assuming the different observed working status (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑊𝐾) 
types on the second contract. The exponentiated value of a coefficient is the relative-risk ratio for 
a one-unit change in the corresponding variable (risk is measured as the risk of the outcome 
relative to the base outcome). The marginal effects are to be interpreted as the change in the 
probability of ending in a particular working status j given a one-unit change in the explanatory 
variable 𝑥𝑖 (Greene, 2002; Verbeek, 2012). A vector of covariates (X) relates to age, sex, 
citizenship, education, sector, and capital town dummies. More specifically, our equation is as 
follows: 
 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑊𝐾𝑗 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑙 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑚, 
 
where 𝐸𝑀𝑃 refers to the i employee-specific characteristics, such as age at the beginning of the 
contract, sex, and citizenship; 𝐸𝐷𝑈 refers to the presence of higher-level education (university or 
higher), and 𝑆𝐸𝐶 refers to sectoral dummies. We also include age squared as a proxy for working 
experience. This equation puts together the opposing forces at play on the labour market with the 
individual features defining the labour supply characteristics and with the sectoral dummies 
identifying the labour demand expressed by employers. The sectoral dimension is of utmost 
importance, as some contractual agreements are typical of given sectors and non-existent in 
others. 
For instance, in Italy in the past couple of decades, most contracts in the education sector 
(public school) for teachers and instructors are fixed term. In the tourism sector, it is common 
practice to offer short-term contracts as the summer season only lasts from May to October. Open-
ended contracts are mostly adopted in the manufacturing and service sectors (e.g. in the banking 
sector). 
We evaluate the likelihood of observing a given type of contract/working status in the 
agreement following the first one, given the initial working status. This provides us with a range 
of probabilities of transition from a contractual form (all types) to a different job or to the same 
as the previous one, as a partial answer to the question of whether any given contractual agreement 
is likely to lead to a permanent job position or act efficiently as a stepping-stone or rather as a 
dead-end. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the information on the employment/unemployment status for 
those individuals who conclude a contract and disappear since workers are only observed when 
entering and exiting a contract. Therefore, we can only assume they have been looking for a job 
until they find one, apart from the subjects that appear once in our time span, and then disappear 
(as for the cases of people retiring). 
As mentioned above, under this empirical investigation, we focus on open-ended contracts, 
fixed-term contracts, para-subordinate contracts (as those are basically formally independent 
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workers but are often engaged in long-term collaborations),4 apprenticeships (as a typical port of 
entry into the dependent labour world), and temporary agency workers (as one of the most 
investigated cases in the literature on the stepping-stone hypothesis). The results of this 
specification, limited to the relative risks for open-ended contracts, are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5 reports six panels. Panel A contains the estimates for all workers with a second 
contract (only the effect for those with an open-ended contract as a second contract is shown 
here). The other panels are conditioned on a selected type for the first contract. Therefore, the first 
panel can be considered a baseline for the other estimations. 
Results are reported as relative-risk ratios. The threshold for interpretation, although quite 
complicated (Greene, 2011), is represented by the value of 1, as all coefficients larger than 1 mean 
that the risk of being observed lies with the current outcome with respect to the base outcome, 
and vice-versa. 
Age always represents a plus when evaluating the probability of observing an open-ended 
contract after a first contract of any kind, but the effect is stronger when the first contract observed 
was an apprenticeship contract. Age squared increased the performance of the specification, but 
the value always ranges around the value of 1, meaning probably that experience in itself is not a 
key determinant of the type of second contract. Being female is never an asset, as the likelihood 
of an open-ended contract always decreases if the worker is a woman (with respect to the base 
outcome, fixed term). Being female has a neutral effect only in the case in which the first contract 
was an open-ended contract. In all other cases but this last, even being a foreign worker gives 
more chance to get an open-ended contract than being a woman. 
Having a university degree always leads to a higher probability of getting an open-ended 
contract, except for the case in which the previous contract was a temporary agency contract. The 
probability is especially high (1.44) in the case in which the previous contract was also an open-
ended contract. This same pattern is reflected in jobs undertaken in the capital, Bologna. 
Construction, trade and tourism, and industry are sectors where the likelihood of ending up with 
an open-ended contract is higher, no matter the first contract. For the education sector, the 
likelihood is much stronger in the case in which the previous contract was another open-ended 
contract. 
We are particularly interested in the predicted value for open-ended contracts stemming from 
the estimation. In panel A, the predicted value is 27.9%. This corresponds to the real percentage 
of individuals with an open-ended contract as a second contract in the population. In other words, 
the model exhibits enough terms to fully explain the effective percentage of individuals with an 
open-ended contract as a second contract. The model is said to be fully saturated. 
 
_________________________ 
4 We partially followed the choice adopted in the Rapporto Ervet on the Labour Market (2015), where the aggregation 
of the ‘proper’ dependent labour concerned open-ended contracts, fixed-term contracts, apprenticeships, and temporary 
agency workers. We opted for retaining in this study the para-subordinate workers since the weight of para-subordinate 
workers among the first contractual agreement observed is over 7%, and remains stable in the second contractual 
agreements observed, larger than the slightly more than 6% of temporary agency workers. Even from the taxation point 
of view, they are assimilated to dependent workers in Italy since 2001, with the same personal income tax and 
employees’ social security contributions. 
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Table 5. Multinomial logit. Determinants of contractual types given the first contractual type, open-ended contracts as a second contract. 
A. Full database   Number of observations 289,974 B. Conditioned on apprenticeships   Number of observations 17,006 
   LR chi(48))  124,532     LR chi(48)) 4,338.04 
   Prob > chi2  0.000     Prob > chi2 0.0000 
Log-likelihood = -302954.54 Pseudo R2  0.1705 Log-likelihood = -20913.403  Pseudo R2 0.094 
Base outcome: fixed-term contracts      Base outcome: fixed-term contracts     
   
Relative-risk 
ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
   
Relative-
risk ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open-ended contracts      Open-ended contracts      
  Age 1.14 0.03 48.49 0.0000   Age 1.27 0.025 12.15 0.000 
  Age^2 0.99 0.00 -47.83 0.0000   Age^2 0.996 0.000 -10.19 0.000 
  Female 0.69 0.01 -36.3 0.0000   Female 0.83 0.041 -3.6 0.000 
  Foreign 0.91 0.01 -7.61 0.0000   Foreign 0.89 0.051 -2 0.046 
  University degree 1.18 0.02 8.26 0.0000   University degree 1.01 0.153 0.07 0.947 
  Bologna 1.30 0.14 24.16 0.0000   Bologna 1.16 0.065 2.7 0.007 
  Agriculture 0.08 0.04 -48.49 0.0000   Agriculture 0.08 0.023 -8.58 0.000 
  Trade & Tourism 1.50 0.01 11.63 0.0000   Trade & Tourism 1.01 0.185 0.09 0.924 
  Constructions 2.37 0.09 23.23 0.0000   Constructions 2.04 0.39 3.73 0.000 
  Industry 2.92 0.10 30.73 0.0000   Industry 2.149 0.39 4.17 0.000 
  Education 1.09 0.04 2.46 0.0140   Education 0.379 0.14 -2.56 0.011 
  Services 3.28 0.11 34.58 0.0000   Services 1.77 0.32 3.15 0.002 
  constant  0.02 0.00 -58.22 0.0000   constant  0.112 0.003 -13.26 0.000 
Predicted CTI Mean 27.9%       Predicted CTI Mean   20.4%       
C. Conditioned on open-ended contracts Number of observations 62,874 D. Conditioned on para-subordinates Number of observations 25,117 
   LR chi(48))  9,146.52     LR chi(48)) 5,916.59 
   Prob > chi2  0.000     Prob > chi2 0 
Log-likelihood = -53096.874 Pseudo R2  0.0793 Log-likelihood = -22743.285  Pseudo R2 0.1151 
Base outcome: fixed-term contracts      Base outcome: fixed-term contracts     
   
Relative-risk 
ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
   
Relative-
risk ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open-ended contracts      Open-ended contracts      
  Age 1.05 0.00 8.11 0.000   Age 1.11 0.016 7.47 0.000 
  Age^2 0.99 0.00 -7.47 0.000   Age^2 0.99 0.000 -6.94 0.000 
  Female 1 0.02 0.15 0.878   Female 0.74 0.035 -6.13 0.000 
  Foreign 0.75 0.02 -12.74 0.000   Foreign 0.88 0.065 -1.63 0.103 
  University degree 1.44 0.07 7.11 0.000   University degree 0.93 0.070 -0.85 0.394 
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-- Open-ended contracts 
   
  --Open-ended contracts 
   
  
  Bologna 1.1 0.02 4.58 0.000   Bologna 1.11 0.055 2.24 0.025 
  Agriculture 0.172 0.02 -18.09 0.000   Agriculture 0.15 0.044 -6.61 0.000 
  Trade & Tourism 1.03 0.08 0.45 0.656   Trade & Tourism 0.85 0.150 -0.87 0.386 
  Constructions 0.99 0.08 -0.06 0.953   Constructions 0.96 0.190 -0.2 0.844 
  Industry 1.86 0.14 8.16 0.000   Industry 1.38 0.250 1.81 0.070 
  Education 3.92 0.39 13.56 0.000   Education 0.86 0.160 -0.74 0.457 
  Services 1.95 0.14 8.87 0.000   Services 1.29 0.220 1.5 0.133 
  constant  0.62 0.09 -3.13 0.002   constant  0.115 0.036 -6.83 0.000 
Predicted CTI Mean 66.9%       Predicted CTI Mean 14.5%       
E. Conditioned on fixed-term contracts       147,367 F. Conditioned on temporary workers Number of observations 26,234 
      36,776.27     LR chi(48)) 5,279.66 
      0.0000     Prob > chi2 0 
Log-likelihood = -103270.97    0.1511 Log-likelihood = -30467.509  Pseudo R2 0.0797 
Base outcome: fixed-term contracts      Base outcome: fixed-term contracts     
   
Relative-risk 
ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
   
Relative-
risk ratio 
Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open-ended contracts      Open-ended contracts      
  Age 1.13 0.005 26.28 0.000   Age 1.04 0.014 2.98 0.0030 
  Age^2 0.99 0 -28.05 0.000   Age^2 0.99 0 -3.1 0.0020 
  Female 0.81 0.013 -12.78 0.000   Female 0.83 0.323 -4.56 0.0000 
  Foreign 0.91 0.016 -4.83 0.000   Foreign 0.92 0.042 -1.66 0.0980 
  University degree 1.05 0.036 1.59 0.111   University degree 0.95 0.076 -0.53 0.5930 
  Bologna 1.31 0.023 15.22 0.000   Bologna 0.95 0.039 -1.1 0.2700 
  Agriculture 0.1 0.008 -29.19 0.000   Agriculture 0.061 0.017 -9.71 0.0000 
  Trade & Tourism 1.58 0.087 8.23 0.000   Trade & Tourism 0.9 0.125 -0.73 0.4640 
  Constructions 2.78 0.164 17.27 0.000   Constructions 1.37 0.216 1.99 0.0460 
  Industry 2.38 0.133 15.55 0.000   Industry 1.5 0.203 2.99 0.0030 
  Education 1.01 0.616 0.19 0.848   Education 0.173 0.068 -4.45 0.0000 
  Services 3.24 0.177 21.49 0.000   Services 1.34 0.184 2.19 0.0280 
  constant  0.01 0.001 -39.84 0.000   constant  0.32 0.087 -4.19 0.0000 
Predicted CTI Mean   15.9%       Predicted CTI Mean   19.8%       
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When we move to the other panels, we find different predictions. In particular, we have 66.9% 
probability of observing an open-ended contract if the previous contract was open-ended as well. 
No prediction is higher; therefore, we can conclude that no situation is better than this to expect 
a second open-ended contract.  
What about the other previous contractual forms? If we were looking for some stepping-stone 
effect, we could compare the same values when observing other contractual forms. If we were 
asked about fixed-term contracts as stepping-stones to open-ended contracts, the answer would 
be a clear ‘no’. Actually, only para-subordinates workers perform (marginally) worse than fixed-
term contracts in increasing the probability of obtaining an open-ended contract (14.5% versus 
15.9%). The best predictor is the apprenticeship contract (20.4%) followed by the temporary 
agency contract (19.8%). Overall, no stepping-stone is observable from this analysis, as none of 
the categories observed performed better than the baseline outcome in panel A, which is the open-
ended contract itself, hinting at the presence of a strong hysteresis (trapping effect) rather than a 
stepping-stone effect. 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
The idea of short-term contracts working as stepping-stones toward more stable form of 
contractual agreements for dependent workers dates back to 2002, when the first massive 
flexibilisation at the margin in the labour market, mainly concerning short-term and temporary 
agency workers, spread wide across European countries. 
In Italy, several reforms brought about a plethora of industry-tailored atypical contracts, 
supported by the empirical literature suggesting the existence of a stepping-stone effect, in the 
hope of boosting employment for young and women cohorts with the additional objective of 
helping firms going through reorganisation and restructuring processes in their search for 
competitiveness. 
The current Italian panorama has changed through the recession and reshaping of the 
industrial world. It has been investigated with a rich and unique dataset of observations of 
dependent workers in Emilia-Romagna. We used a multinomial logit model to detect whether any 
stepping-stone effect is at work in the region. We find that the best stepping-stone toward 
permanent jobs is a permanent job itself. Actually, workers tend to remain with the same contract 
type over time. Although fixed-term workers represent prevalent contractual agreements, they 
have a high probability of being awarded the same type of contract again rather than to be 
transformed into permanent workers. 
The empirical evidence speaks against the existence of a stepping-stone effect, hinting rather 
towards the presence of a bottleneck effect, constituted by the various short-term contracts we 
analysed here. Being female is never an asset, as the likelihood of an open-ended contract always 
decreases if the worker is a woman (with respect to the base outcome, fixed term). Being female 
has a neutral effect only in the case in which the first contract is an open-ended contract. In all 
other cases but this last, even being a foreign worker gives more chance to obtain an open-ended 
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contract than being a woman. Having a university degree always leads to higher probability of 
getting an open-ended contract, but for the case in which the previous contract was a temporary 
agency contract. 
The lesson we can draw from this evidence is against the wide use of short-term jobs as 
instruments for job stabilisation and labour market efficiency. Although it is acknowledged that 
new contracts eased access to the labour market for given categories, workers are being defined 
as ‘employed’ by the national statistical institute questionnaires if the interviewees answer ‘yes’ 
to the question: ‘Have you been working at least one hour in the past week?’ Labour market 
reforms have had the effect of increasing (marginally) employment and uncertainty at the same 
time, but the theme of job stabilisation has apparently been neglected. Recent evidence from the 
labour market in Italy points to an increasing fragmentation of contracts, as recent reforms (2018) 
are creating even more hassles for firms wishing to turn to short-term contracts, with the result 
that unemployment has been slightly increasing as the renewals of short-term positions have 
slowed down. 
Thus, the discussion should probably move from the presence or lack of a stepping-stone to 
the definition of ‘employment’ and how it changed in recent decades. It appears evident that 
working life perspectives and therefore the working experience cannot be evaluated using the 
same instruments adopted 20 years ago, as labour market conditions and the institutional approach 
to policy have changed substantially. A number of workers remain trapped in the previous 
contract type, in a perpetual loop of renewals where psychological factors can induce more stress 
and less resilience on the job. 
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Appendix 
A.1 Reclassification of Labour Contractual Agreements 
Codes Description 
CTI – Open-ended contracts Open-ended contracts 
Open-ended dependent labour in the public administration 
Open-ended job sharing 
Open-ended domestic labour 
Open-ended labour in the Arts & Show sector 
Maritime open-ended contracts 
CAI – Apprenticeships 
contracts 
Apprenticeship leading to a profession 
Apprenticeship to fulfil the duty-responsibility of education/training 
Apprenticeship to obtain a diploma or higher education programmes 
Apprenticeship as per art.16. Law 196/97. 
Access-to-work contracts 
Contracts for line-up type a1 
Porting 
CTD – Fixed-term contracts Fixed-term contracts 
Fixed-term dependent labour in the public administration 
Fixed-term job sharing 
Fixed-term labour in the Arts & Show sector 
Maritime fixed-term contracts 
Fixed-term contracts for substitution 
Fixed-term contracts in Agriculture 
SOM – Temporary agency 
work 
Open-ended temporary agency work 
Fixed-term temporary agency work 
LINT – Jobs on call  Open-ended jobs on call 
Fixed-term jobs on call 
LDOM – Domestic labour Open-ended domestic labour 
Fixed-term domestic labour 
LPAR – Para-subordinate 
work 
Project contracts/continued and coordinated collaboration 
Casual work 
Open-ended association in participation 
Fixed-term association in participation 
Autonomous work in the Arts & Show sector 
Open-ended agency contracts 
Fixed-term agency contracts 
ELAV – Traineeships Traineeships, internships 
Community service 
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A.2 Determinants of Contractual Types, First Contract (2008) 
    Number of 
observations 
  561,494 
  LR chi2(84)   322,545.82 
  Prob > chi2   0.0000 
Log-likelihood -684585.68 Pseudo R2   0.1907 
Base outcome: fixed-
term contracts 
    
    Relative-risk ratio Std. Error z P>|z| 
Open-ended 
contracts 
    
 Age 1.02 0.0003 40.36 0.0000 
 Female 0.7 0.0051 -48.95 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.98 0.0078 -1.58 0.1140 
 University degree 1.37 0.0229 19.28 0.0000 
 High School degree 1.27 0.0123 24.89 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.37 0.0110 39.73 0.0000 
 Education 0.85 0.0199 -6.92 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 1.01 0.0194 0.57 0.5710 
 Industry 2.31 0.0440 44.11 0.0000 
 Services 2.36 0.0441 46.32 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.06 0.0021 -85.61 0.0000 
 Constructions 1.84 0.0384 29.33 0.0000 
 constant  0.34 0.0074 -49.44 0.0000 
Apprenticeships      
 Age 0.75 0.001 -166.23 0.0000 
 Female 1.00 0.015 0.07 0.9460 
 Foreign 0.72 0.012 -19.33 0.0000 
 University degree 1.55 0.077 8.96 0.0000 
 High School degree 1.25 0.026 10.91 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.15 0.020 8.48 0.0000 
 Education 0.09 0.013 -17.45 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 1.28 0.050 6.5 0.0000 
 Industry 2.01 0.080 17.78 0.0000 
 Services 1.26 0.050 5.91 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.03 0.003 -37.91 0.0000 
 Constructions 3.16 0.133 27.33 0.0000 
 constant  1.44 1.440 95.71 0.0000 
Para-subordinates      
 Age 1.020 0.000 50.97 0.0000 
 Female 0.630 0.007 -38.7 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.270 0.005 -68.31 0.0000 
 University degree 1.130 0.026 5.56 0.0000 
 High School degree 0.760 0.013 -15.98 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.690 0.021 43.24 0.0000 
 Education 3.320 0.117 34.23 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 0.870 0.030 -4.03 0.0000 
 Industry 1.020 0.036 0.68 0.4940 
 Services 3.310 0.102 34.92 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.040 0.003 -44.88 0.0000 
 Constructions 0.770 0.031 -6.46 0.0000 
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Traineeships      
 constant  0.060 0.003 -70.62 0.0000 
      
 Age 0.790 0.002 -94.08 0.0000 
 Female 1.190 0.028 7.81 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.350 0.012 -29.46 0.0000 
 University degree 3.400 0.154 27.02 0.0000 
 High School degree 1.340 0.040 10.07 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.220 0.032 7.68 0.0000 
 Education 1.020 0.084 0.26 0.7980 
 Trade & Tourism 0.820 0.052 -3.13 0.0020 
 Industry 1.730 0.110 8.67 0.0000 
 Services 2.180 0.134 12.72 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.070 0.009 -21.1 0.0000 
 Constructions 0.620 0.055 -5.33 0.0000 
 constant  1.310 1.046 32.53 0.0000 
Domestic Labour      
 Age 1.05 0.001 63.55 0.0000 
 Female 4.82 0.114 66.37 0.0000 
 Foreign 2.78 0.789 117.66 0.0000 
 University degree 0.72 0.046 -5.11 0.0000 
 High School degree 0.72 0.033 -7.04 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.17 0.026 7.57 0.0000 
 Education 0.15 0.056 -5.09 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 0.34 0.043 -8.58 0.0000 
 Industry 0.80 0.101 -1.76 0.0790 
 Services 2.95 3.027 33.08 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.11 0.018 -13.48 0.0000 
 Constructions 1.12 0.163 0.8 0.4240 
 constant  0.00 0.000 -87.89 0.0000 
Jobs on call      
 Age 0.99 0.001 -9.1 0.0000 
 Female 0.96 0.021 -2.12 0.0340 
 Foreign 0.53 0.015 -22.24 0.0000 
 University degree 0.47 0.036 -9.88 0.0000 
 High School degree 0.69 0.022 -11.5 0.0000 
 Bologna 0.62 0.019 -15.51 0.0000 
 Education 0.27 0.028 -12.69 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 2.94 0.170 18.68 0.0000 
 Industry 0.28 0.021 -16.88 0.0000 
 Services 1.37 0.082 5.38 0.0000 
 Agriculture 0.01 0.002 -15.39 0.0000 
 Constructions 0.14 0.017 -15.76 0.0000 
 constant  0.06 0.004 -41.59 0.0000 
Temporary agency 
work  
    
 Age 0.96 0.0006 -63.16 0.0000 
 Female 0.86 0.0108 -11.83 0.0000 
 Foreign 0.87 0.0123 -9.86 0.0000 
 University degree 1.00 0.0410 10.26 0.0000 
      
-- Temporary agency      
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 High School degree 1.60 0.0219 19.65 0.0000 
 Bologna 1.36 0.0229 38.81 0.0000 
 Education 0.03 0.0043 -27.03 0.0000 
 Trade & Tourism 0.80 0.0267 -6.65 0.0000 
 Industry 3.84 0.1223 42.41 0.0000 
 Services 0.90 0.0297 -3.20 0.0010 
 Agriculture 0.05 0.0038 -40.74 0.0000 
 Constructions 0.38 0.0176 -20.91 0.0000 
  constant  0.44 0.0164 -21.92 0.0000 
 
Age at the beginning of the contract has a positive effect on all types of contract but traineeships, 
apprenticeships, jobs on call and somehow temporary agency workers. Being female does not 
improve the “risk” of being hired into an open-ended contract with respect to a fixed-term 
contract, but females are especially unlikely to get a para-subordinate job, with respect to all the 
other job categories; instead, being female represents a plus when domestic labour is taken into 
account, and with a much stronger risk ratio (4.82) than any other variable and category. The 
gender effect is particularly reinforced by being a foreign worker, as being foreign for domestic 
labour is the only situation where the relative-risk ratio is pretty larger than 1 and significantly 
different from zero. In all other cases, being foreign sounds more as a disadvantage. This evidence 
is explained by the widespread phenomenon of foreign, mid-aged women coming from abroad to 
work as caretakers. Women have a marginal advantage respect to men only in two entry-level 
categories of contracts, traineeships and apprenticeships. 
Having a university-level degree has a positive effect over all categories with respect to fixed-
term contracts, but on domestic labour, jobs on call and temporary agency workers. The category 
that benefits more from a university degree (with an effect almost triple than the other types) is 
traineeships, indicating as this is likely to be the preferred port of entry into the labour markets 
for the youngsters after completing a cycle of superior studies, as also confirmed by the negative 
effect of age. The fact of working in Bologna, capital town of the region, affects positively the 
risk in all categories but in jobs on call, for which instead a specific sector specific pattern emerges 
in Trade & Tourism. Jobs on call are typically exploited during the summer season on the coastal 
areas (Rimini, Riccione, etc..) while those working in the same sector in Bologna are not subjected 
to such a strong seasonality effect and are likely taken in with other contractual agreements. Open-
ended contracts have a positive risk of being adopted over fixed-term contracts in the services and 
industry sectors: the risk over a fixed term is more than double. 
The typical agency worker has more chances in the industrial sectors than in any other sector 
(3.84); traineeships are more frequent in services (for high skilled, managerial and professional 
positions). Teachers and instructors, isolated from the other services to proxy for the role of the 
public administration (as teachers are basically all public employees) have a positive risk of being 
hired as para-subordinate workers with respect to fixed term, but the risk is otherwise negative 
for the other contractual forms, and while other contractual forms are simply irrelevant for 
teachers (who do not enter the domestic labour market, for instance, nor do apprenticeships) the 
negative effect is relevant with when assessing the open-ended contracts too. This can be 
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interpreted in the light of the progressive de-stabilisation of the teacher contractual type, once 
considered a sort of safe haven against unemployment – as all teachers were basically taken in 
with fixed-term contracts. This is a meaningful episode that confirms the increase perception of 
uncertainty detected by the ESS data, as baseline, stable type of jobs, simply do not exist anymore 
in that sector, or decrease in importance through time. When considering the first contract, 51% 
of workers in the education sector were hired through a fixed-term contract, 24% as para-
subordinate workers and 21% with open-ended contracts. Teachers represent over 60% of workers 
hired in the education sector, and half of them are hired through fixed-term contracts. 
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